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4 Preface by the Danish Presidency 
In accordance with the decision of the Council on 28  May 2001, the Working Party on Schengen 
Evaluation  has  initiated  the  drawing  up  of a  Catalogue  of recommendations  for  the  proper 
application of  the Schengen acquis and ofbest practice. 
The  purpose  of the  Catalogue  is  to  clarify  and  detail  the  Schengen  acquis  and  to  indicate 
recommendations and best practices,  in order to provide an  example for those States acceding to 
Schengen and also those fully applying the Schengen acquis.  The aim is not to give an exhaustive 
definition  of the  whole  of the  Schengen  acquis  but  to  put  forward  recommendations  and  best 
practices in the light of the experience gained through the continuous evaluation in the Schengen 
States of  the correct application of  the Schengen acquis. 
The  first  volume  of the  Catalogue  regards  external  borders,  removal  and  readmission.  It  was 
adopted and handed over to the candidate countries at the Council on 28 February 2002. 
Denmark, which has held the Presidency of the Council of  the European Union since  1 July 2002, 
considers  it  very  important to  continue the work on  drafting  the  Catalogue.  During the Danish 
Presidency  a  second  volume  of the  Catalogue  has  been  drafted.  This  Catalogue  regards  the 
Schengen Information System and the application of  the SIRENE Manual. 
The Danish Presidency would like to thank the Schengen States and the Commission for help and 
good cooperation in drawing up the Catalogue and  in this connection addresses special thanks to 
Norway, the Presidency of  the Mixed Committee, for helping the Danish Presidency by chairing the 
sub group, which has drafted the Catalogue. 
The purpose of  the Catalogue is explanatory and it has no legally binding status. It shows, set out in 
separate columns, on the one hand, the levels which should be required in order to comply with the 
Schengen acquis, and on the other hand, the best practices recorded in some of  the Member States. 
The  Catalogue will  be  handed  over to the  acceding  countries  and  the  candidate countries.  The 
Danish Presidency is confident that it will constitute a useful and additional instrument for ensuring 
the successful integration of  the new Member States of the European Union in due time and in the 
appropriate manner. 
December 2002 
5 SCHENGEN CATALOGUE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  At  its  meeting  on  28  May  2001,  the  Council  set  as  an  objective  for  further  work by  the 
Working Party on Schengen Evaluation the identification of "  ... best practices, particularly as 
regards  border  controls,  so  that they  can  serve  as  examples  for  those  States  acceding  to 
Schengen but  also  those  fully  applying  the  Schengen  acquis.  These  evaluations  and  the 
identification of best practices  shall  serve  as  inspiration for the establishment of standards 
defining  the  minimum  application  of the  Schengen  acquis  ( ... )  in  the  relevant  working 
groups" (mandate for the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation) (8881/01 - SCH-EV  AL 17, 
COMIX 371). 
On the basis of this  mandate,  the Working Party on  Schengen Evaluation worked out the 
principles and  procedure for drawing up  the  Catalogue of recommendations for the correct 
application of  the Schengen acquis and best practices, hereinafter referred to as the Catalogue 
of  recommendations and best practices, or Catalogue. 
The purpose of the Catalogue is  to clarify and  detail  the  Schengen acquis  and to indicate 
recommendations and best practices, in order to provide an example for those States acceding 
to  Schengen  and  also  those  fully  applying  the  Schengen  acquis.  With  this  in  mind  the 
Catalogue gives a good indication to the candidate countries for  accession to the European 
Union (hereinafter referred to as the "EU") (at their request) as to what is expected of them, 
particularly  in  practical  terms,  regarding  Schengen.  The  aim  is  not to give  an  exhaustive 
definition of  the whole of the Schengen acquis but to put forward recommendations and best 
practices in the light of  the experience gained by the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation 
in verifying the correct application of  the Schengen acquis in several countries. 
The text of  the Catalogue does not seek to introduce new requirements but should also make it 
possible  to  draw the  Council's  attention  to  the  need  where  appropriate  to  amend  certain 
provisions  of the  Schengen  acquis  so  that  the  Commission  and,  where  appropriate,  the 
Member  States  take  the  recommendations  and  best  practices  into  account  when  putting 
forward proposals or formal initiatives.  This exercise is inter alia the first stage of  the process 
of  defining minimum standards by the Council. 
7 Moreover, the Catalogue will serve as a reference tool for future evaluations undertaken in the 
candidate countries.  It will therefore also serve as an indicator for these countries of  the tasks 
which  they  will  be  assigned  and  in  this  respect  should  be  read  in  conjunction  with  the 
SIRENE Manual. 
2.  The Working Party on Schengen Evaluation adopted the following definitions to conduct this 
exercise: 
recommendations:  non-exhaustive  senes  of measures  which  should  make  it  possible  to 
establish a basis for the correct application of  the Schengen acquis and for monitoring it. 
best  practices:  non-exhaustive  set of working methods or model  measures which  must  be 
considered as the optimal application of  the Schengen acquis, it being understood that several 
best practices are possible for each specific part of  Schengen cooperation. 
3.  Where the Catalogue mentions the Member States which apply the Schengen acquis, this is 
currently to be taken as meaning the thirteen Member States of  the EU referred to in Article 1 
of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of  the EU annexed to the 
Treaty  on  European  Union  and  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community 
(hereinafter the "Schengen Protocol"), to which must be added Iceland and Norway, pursuant 
to the Agreement concluded by the Council of  the European Union, the Republic of Iceland 
and  the  Kingdom  of Norway  concerning  the  latters'  association  with the  implementation, 
application and development of  the Schengen acquis, signed on 18 May 1999 (these 15  States 
are hereinafter referred to as the "Schengen States"). 
8 
The United Kingdom and Ireland have expressed the wish to participate in certain provisions 
of the  Schengen  acquis.  The  arrangements  for  the  United  Kingdom's  participation  were 
adopted  in  the Council Decision of 29  May 2000  (2000/365/EC),  those for  Ireland  in  the 
Council Decision of 28 February 2002 (2002/192/EC).  The Council has not yet decided on 
the implementation of  the provisions in question. 
The Schengen acquis and the other measures taken by the institutions within the scope of the 
acquis are,  under Article 8 of the Schengen Protocol, regarded as an acquis which must be 
accepted in full by all States candidates for accession. 4.  The Schengen acquis was integrated into the EU framework by the Schengen Protocol.  The 
extent of the acquis is  defined in Council Decision 1999/435/EC, published in  OJ L  176 of 
10 July 1999. 
Since  its  integration  into  the EU,  the  Schengen  acquis  has  undergone  developments  and 
amendments which lend it an evolutionary character. 
The Schengen acquis has also taken on board the results of the evaluations which have been 
conducted within the framework of  the Standing Committee for the application and evaluation 
of  the Schengen acquis, now called the "Working Party on Schengen Evaluation".  Under the 
Working  Party's  mandate,  reports  are  submitted  to  the  Council  to  establish  whether  the 
conditions required for  the entry into force  of the  provisions of the  Schengen  acquis  in a 
country wishing to participate in those provisions (or in some of them) have been met and, 
secondly, to monitor the correct application of  the Schengen acquis by the Schengen States, in 
particular by detecting problems and proposing solutions. 
5.  The first volume of the Catalogue, which was handed over to the candidate countries at the 
Council of  28 February 2002, dealt primarily with issues of  borders and removal. The current 
second volume of the Catalogue deals with the Schengen Information System,  notably the 
application  of the  SIRENE Manual.  Free  movement within  the  territory  of the  Schengen 
States is a freedom which as a counterpart requires not only the strengthening of  the common 
external borders and a policy for the removal of illegally resident third-country nationals, but 
also  the rapid  and  efficient exchange of information in  the context of border controls and 
police  co-operation.  Accordingly,  the  measures  adopted in  this  context  seek to  strengthen 
European integration and in particular to enable the EU to become more rapidly an area of 
freedom, security and justice. 
6.  The  current  volume of the Catalogue comprises the  chapter on the  SIS/SIRENE.  A  short 
general  section  describes  the  basic  concepts  underlying  the  recommendations  and  best 
practices set out. These are presented in tabular form,  with recommendations on the left and 
best practices on the right, alongside the relevant recommendations. 
*  *  * 
9 PART ill: THE SCHENGEN INFORMATION SYSTEM 
DETAILS OF  RECOMMENDATIONS AND BEST  PRACTICES 
GENERAL SECTION 
The list of recommendations and best practices set out hereunder has been compiled mainly on the 
basis of  the outcome of different evaluations carried out over the last years, both evaluations of  the 
SIS in different countries and more specific evaluations of  the SIRENEs. 
The  content of this  Catalogue has  been  drafted  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  independent  from the 
underlying technical system, i.e.  SIS  1  + or SIS II. It is indeed meant to be used in the setting up of 
national databases which will provide the information for the SIS as well as in the preparation of  the 
national section of  the SIS, whatever form this may take with the SIS IT architecture. 
It is recalled that, in any event, to the extent that EU classified information is handled by the users 
of Schengen IT systems, Council Decision 2001/264/EC adopting the Council's security regulations 
is applicable (OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p.  1). 
Concerning the introduction of alerts in the SIS, the underlying basic principle is to find a balance 
between inserting as much as possible alerts in the SIS, within the framework of  the provisions of 
the Convention, and  ensuring that the alerts inserted in the SIS  are of good quality.  Both are an 
essential  condition  for  the  efficiency  and  usefulness  of the  SIS.  Every  national  alert  that  is 
"Schengen-relevant" should in principle be introduced in the SIS.  However, in order to be able to 
execute the alert,  it  is  necessary that the alert  is  correct,  as  complete  as  possible  and  traceable. 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that when a Schengen State executes an alert, it has the right to 
expect that the issuing Schengen State will follow up the hit.  Not doing so without a valid (legal) 
reason will negatively impact on the willingness of (local) authorities to use the SIS and maximise 
its potential. 
11 The role of  the SIRENE in the working of  the SIS is absolutely essential. Whereas it is not expected 
or necessary that the  SIRENE is  responsible  for  every  single  action  in  relation to the  SIS,  the 
SIRENE is the human interface of  the SIS. This implies that it has a role of first-line contact both 
for the other SIRENEs and for national authorities and end-users. Depending on the case, SIRENE 
must be able to deal with it independently or to refer it to the competent authorities or agencies. 
SIRENE staff should therefore be competent and well-trained and have established good contacts 
with national and foreign authorities. 
12 RECOMMENDATIONS/BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATIONS  BEST PRACTICES 
1. National section of the SIS 
1.1 systems and organisation 
- a national section for the SIS must be set up  - maintenance and service level commitments for 
providing 24/7 operation with sufficient  hardware and software should be provided for to 
engineer support at all times  ensure the 24/7 operation 
- guarantee data integrity between N. SIS and  - real-time synchronisation of  copies 
any national technical copies, where these  - regular database comparisons 
exist 
I. 2 communication infrastructure 
- there should be a stable national network  - appropriate maintenance and service level 
commitments should be provided to guarantee a 
high availability of  the network 
- a rapid response time to queries should be  - the response time should be less than 5 seconds 
ensured 
- SIS data available at consular posts must be  - at best, consular posts should have on-line 
updated regularly  access to the relevant SIS data 
- where only off-line access can be provided, 
updates of  the database should be sent every 
second week and additional phone check should 
be made 
13 RECOMMENDATIONS  BEST PRACI'ICES 
2. SIRENE 
2.1 national structure 
- a SIRENE must be set up and designated as  - all offices responsible for international police 
the single point of  contact for each Schengen  co-operation, should be accessed through a 
State in respect of  SIS alerts and post-hit  single point of  contact, be contained within the 
procedure  same management structure and located at the 
same site 
- the principle that Schengen alerts take  - the Interpol alert should include a note for the 
precedence over Interpol alerts should be  Schengen States indicating the Schengen ID-
respected and enforced  number of  the alert 
2. 2 organisation and  system 
- the SIRENE must provide 24/7 cover for  - continuity of  management, staff and technical 
communication with all other SIRENEs and  aspects 
national authorities 
- all staff, including those who are assigned to  - flexibility of  working arrangements 
work out of  office hours, should have the 
competence and experience to provide the 
necessary service to other SIRENEs and deal 
with any incoming alerts 
- in addition to administrative and operational  - maintenance and service level commitments 
staff, there is a defined need for IT support  for hardware and software should be provided 
staff  for to be ensure the 24/7 operation 
-the SIRENE must be equipped with an  - an electronic workflow/case management 
efficient and effective workflow system  system for SIRENE operators has been found 
to enhance the quality of  work and reduce the 
possibility of  mistakes 
14 RECOMMENDATIONS  BEST PRACTICES 
-the electronic workflow/case management 
system should interact with the N.SIS 
application and national systems in respect of 
the management of  incoming and outgoing 
alerts; this should include automatic 
indications 
• of  whether a requested flag has been added 
or deleted 
•  of  when an alert has changed 
•  of  the arrival of  a new Article 95 alert 
- the SIRENE should have the possibility to  - electronic transmission of  images is preferred 
quickly and efficiently transmit images, such  to ensure the transmission of  useable images 
as photographs and fingerprints  - for such electronic transmission, the 
ANSIINIST  -CLS 1-1993 standard or later 
revisions should be used 
2. 3 recruitment and training 
- the SIRENE should have a workforce able to  - there should be management support, including 
function on their own initiative, in order to  access out-of-hours to legal and other expert 
ensure an efficient handling of  cases  advice, to enable devolved responsibility 
- special attention should be paid to human 
resources management to ensure continuity of 
personnel, which is an asset for enhancing the 
quality of  the SIRENE work 
- a training system of  the SIRENE workflow 
should be available 
- all operators should have a good knowledge of 
national legal issues, national law enforcement 
(including a theoretical knowledge of  police 
activities), national judiciary and immigration 
administration system and as a minimum a 
basic knowledge of  international legal issues 
15 RECO~NDATIONS  BEST PRACTICES 
- legal expertise should be available with a good  - legal expertise can be provided through the 
knowledge of  national and international law, a  recruitment of  in-house legal advisors or 
thorough knowledge of  the Schengen  organising legal training for SIRENE staff 
Convention and related regulations and a 
theoretical knowledge of  police activities 
- staff  with a law enforcement background are 
needed in order to provide experience which 
has been shown to be significantly 
advantageous and reduces the time of  training 
- establish common standards and common  - common training, at least once a year 
understanding  - regular exchange of  operators, starting prior to 
the operational use of  the SIS 
- recruitment levels should take account of 
number of  national alerts and the re-
examination of  these alerts at end of  their 
validity period as well as of  the number of  hits 
on the national territory 
- the SIRENE recruitment strategy should 
provide for the validation of  the existing 
Article 95 files prior to the operational use of 
the SIS 
- staff should have sufficient linguistic skills  - this should be a key element in the recruitment 
process and ongoing training for SIRENE staff 
- SIRENE staff should get priority in language 
training 
- the standard practice is to exchange forms in 
the language of  the issuing country and English 
16 RECOMMENDATIONS  BEST PRACTICES 
- for utmost efficiency in bilateral  - it is clearly desirable that operators are 
communication, languages familiar to both  knowledgeable in the most commonly spoken 
parties shall be used  languages, both for direct communication and 
the ability to manage documentation in the 
absence of  translation support 
17 RECOMMENDATIONS  BEST PRACTICES 
3. End-users 
3.1 querying and user interface 
- there is a need for querying or searching that  - examples of  this include phonetic queries, 
goes beyond exact match searching  wildcard queries, fuzzy logic, soundex 
- single query for both national and international  - it should be ensured that such a single query is 
systems is the most efficient way to guarantee  not prevented by national legislation 
systematic consultation of  the SIS  - it should be ensured that single query is quick 
and easy 
- direct access is preferable  - the largest possible number of  data querying 
devices should be provided to end-users to 
allow direct queries 
- information both on national and international 
alerts should be shown simultaneously 
- information that the person is considered 
dangerous and/or armed should be available to 
the end-user on the first screen 
- when introducing national alerts, the insertion  - alerts should be pre-checked at the national 
of  the alert in the SIS should be set as a default  database and from there be transferred to the 
function so that this insertion does not require  N.SIS in an automated way 
an additional action on the part of  the end-user 
- pre-existing national data should be checked 
on their Schengen-relevance and correctness 
before the initial data-loading of  national alerts 
in the SIS 
- display clear information and instructions  - in the case of  misused identity, clearly display 
about the actions the end-user has to carry out  on the screen the procedure for dealing with a 
in case of  a hit  hit on a misused identity and the subsequent 
investigations that should be carried out to 
establish the whether the person is the victim 
or the perpetrator of  the misuse 
18 RECOMMENDATIONS  BEST PRACfiCES 
- applications should be developed in a user- -where appropriate, querying the SIS could be 
friendly way, allowing for speedy and  combined with querying existing systems 
effective means of  carrying out SIS tasks  -when entering a name during a query, the 
system should check both the data on persons 
and on documents 
- the user interface should allow and encourage 
that the name and, where applicable, the 
document number are entered simultaneously 
and the application should check both in the 
same query 
3.2 training 
- ensure awareness of  interested parties in SIS:  - provide for permanent training of  these parties 
police and other (law enforcement) agencies,  - make a training system available to end users 
magistrates and prosecuting authorities  - ensure close contact of  the interested parties 
with SIRENE through liaison officers 
- promote awareness via the relevant working 
groups (police co-operation, border control, 
police chiefs task force, judicial co-operation, 
terrorism working group) or via CEPOL 
- authorities responsible for public security 
could be made (more) aware of  the possibility 
of  introducing alerts under Article 96(2)(b) 
- the training on SIS should be included in the  - explain what effect the lifting of  the internal 
end-users' initial training as well as in  border controls has on police work 
continuous training, already before the  - explain the use of  SIS as day-to-day police tool 
operational use of  the SIS  - the training should cover both querying the 
system and introducing alerts 
- SIRENE staff should participate in police 
schools' SIS training 
19 RECOM1\1ENDATIONS  BEST PRACTICES 
- handbooks on internal procedures should be  - manuals, including the SIRENE manual, 
developed  information, training and refresher materials 
- updated instructions reflecting new functions  should be available on the police intranet or 
should be issued  other media 
- before Schengen start, cascade training should  - before the operational use of  the SIS, a 
be organised  newsletter informing the end-users on the 
- refresher courses should be provided once the  status of  the project can ensure and guarantee 
end-users have gained a certain experience  their interest 
- the implementation of SIS should be a 
seamless extension of  current national 
querying methods so as to reduce the need for 
training 
20 RECOl\1MENDATIONS  BEST PRACTICES 
4. Data handling 
4.1 entry I modification I deletion of  alerts 
- at insertion, all alerts should satisfy the criteria  - inform the authorities which introduce alerts in 
to ensure that a hit will be followed up  the SIS about the consequences of  such 
introductions and notably the obligation to 
follow up a hit 
- establish national procedures defining the 
responsibilities for full submission of 
extradition requests or for retrieving stolen 
vehicles ... 
- examine the files on existing alerts pursuant to  - ensure that the SIRENE workflow system 
Article 95 before they are available to the end- emits an automatic warning when a new alert 
user  pursuant to Article 95 is entered 
- if  it has not been possible to pre-validate all 
files on alerts pursuant to Article 95, these 
alerts should nevertheless be made available to 
the end-users as soon as the system is open to 
the end users, without waiting for the result of 
the examination of  the A-form by SIRENE; in 
this case, procedures must be established to 
ensure a swift examination of  the file if  the 
alert is executed 
- the priority and incompatibility rules should be  - SIRENE operators should be allowed to 
respected  manually delete alerts that do not respect the 
priority and incompatibility rules 
- "secondary" alerts on a person should be kept 
available so that they can be inserted when the 
first alert on this person, with which the 
"secondary" alert was incompatible, expires 
21 RECOMMENDATIONS  BEST PRACTICES 
- national legislation should allow for all actions, 
notably "specific checks" pursuant to Article 
99 
- before extending an alert, its on-going validity 
and relevance should be re-examined 
- Schengen ID-numbers should not be re-used 
- the time between the incident and the  - the entry of  alerts should preferably be done in 
introduction of  an alert in the SIS should be  real time 
minimised  - decentralise entry of  alerts (especially on 
objects) as much as possible to avoid delays 
due to internal administration procedure, such 
as posting the alerts to data input centres 
- where direct introduction is not possible, quick 
means of  transmission should be provided to 
send the information from the local level to the 
level where the data are inserted, in particular 
for alerts on missing children and stolen 
vehicles 
- alerts that fulfil the Schengen criteria should, 
insofar as possible, be entered in the SIS in an 
automated way: if  the SIRENE has to 
manually copy such alerts from national 
systems to insert them in the SIS, this often 
causes delays 
22 RECOMMENDATIONS  BEST PRACfiCES 
- data quality measures should be set up to avoid  - a vehicle registration number should not be re-
that SIS alerts affect persons unconcerned with  issued for use as long as it is a subject of  an 
the alert  SIS alert 
- it is standard practice that an alert is deleted 
from the SIS and kept only in the national 
database when it is established, where this is 
provided for under national law, that a stolen 
vehicle has been lawfully obtained by a bona 
fide owner 
- the systematic input of  alerts in the SIS should 
be enhanced as much as possible and national 
criteria should be set for such introduction 
- at insertion, it should be checked whether there  - the system should automatically check for 
is no double alert  possible double alerts through searching that 
goes beyond exact match searching 
4. 2 follow-up of  hits 
- the SIRENE must be the single point of 
contact and the conduit for the transmission of 
all information in relation to the post-hit 
procedure 
- for alerts pursuant to Article 95, the SIRENE  - the exchange of  all information not requiring a 
must be the single point of  contact and is  rogatory letter should be sent through SIRENE 
responsible for the post-hit exchange of  -where possible and/or appropriate, the SIRENE 
information until at least the formal extradition  may facilitate any further exchange of 
procedure starts  information subsequent to the arrest 
23 RECOMMENDATIONS  BEST PRACTICES 
- a reply, or at least a preliminary answer on the  - it should be ensured that also the authorities 
status of  the case, should be sent within the set  responsible for dealing with third country 
time periods  nationals' are available 24/7 or organised in 
such a way that deadlines for giving additional 
information can be respected: the SIRENE 
could be given access to the database of  these 
authorities 
- an alert should be deleted from the SIS once  - alerts pursuant to Article 95 should be deleted 
the need for the alert does not exist anymore  once extradition has taken place 
- alerts pursuant to Article 96 should not be 
deleted after a hit 
- alerts on adults pursuant to Article 97, not 
requiring to be placed under protection, should 
be deleted upon a hit 
- other alerts pursuant to Article 97 should be 
deleted when the protective measures are 
executed 
- an alert on a stolen vehicle (including the 
double alerts) should be deleted rapidly after 
the hit to avoid problems when returning the 
vehicle 
- procedures should be established to ensure that  - define the roles and responsibilities of  the 
actions on lost objects are rapidly carried out  concerned parties 
- provide statistics on hits  - a hit is a positive response found in a Schengen 
State to an alert issued by another Schengen 
State 
- every hit should be accurately registered, 
including those on alerts pursuant to Article 96 
- hits should be categorised per article 
24 4. 3 data quality measures 
- automated introduction of  SIS data, via a link  - this is satisfied where the introduction in the 
between the relevant national databases and  SIS is set as a default option, as recommended 
the N.SIS database  in chapter 3  .1 
- automated introduction of  alerts should be 
accompanied by a real-time automated 
change/deletion in the SIS following a 
change/deletion in the national system 
- alerts should be as complete as possible  - the data of  the alert should be checked, 
preferably in an automated way, against 
national registers 
- alerts should be updated with additional 
information, as it becomes available, such as 
the document number of  an issued document or 
VIN of  a stolen car 
- the SIRENE of  the country of  origin of  a stolen 
object should provide supplementary 
information to update the alert 
25 - SIRENE should act as data quality assurance 
manager 
-the SIRENE must validate every alert pursuant 
to Article 95 
- the SIRENE should have the national 
competence as well as the operational and 
technical means to ensure data quality, 
including having access to national databases, 
and dip-sample all categories of  all alerts 
-the SIRENE should be involved in users' 
training 
- the lists of  hits should be checked against the 
lists of  deleted alerts 
- the alerts/hits ratio should be reviewed and 
studied 
- it should be regularly checked with the local 
authorities whether it is necessary to maintain 
an alert on a missing minor 
- the transliteration rules should be respected  - specific information on transliteration rules 
should be made available to the end-users 
- the end-users should be trained in data quality  - introducing untraceable information is not 
measures  allowed, e.g. filling in "unknown" in 
mandatory fields, leaving optional fields blank 
instead of  filling in "unknown" or"?" 
26 RECOMMENDATIONS  BEST PRACTICES 
5. Security 
5.1 Planning of  data security work 
- the determination of  a security policy for the 
Schengen IT systems (N.SIS, C. SIS, SIRENE 
and end-users systems) should be an integral 
part of  the definition of  the overall security 
policy of  the authorities concerned with these 
systems 
- the security policy adopted has to be 
documented in writing by the competent 
authorities 
- it is vital to allocate the necessary resources 
for preparing and maintaining security 
measures 
- at the national level, procedures and areas of 
responsibility should be established to ensure 
that all security measures are continuously 
updated and revised 
- the updating or revision should, as far as 
practible, be carried out once every year so 
that they are constantly adequate and reflect 
existing conditions 
- in addition, updating and revision should take 
place following significant/serious incidents or 
following system changes that have an impact 
on data security 
27 5. 2 Security organisation 
- efforts to ensure data security should -
whenever appropriate - be planned within the 
framework of  a security organisation, which 
may comprise one or more authorities 
- responsibilities and authority delegated to 
persons involved in data security work should 
be clearly defined, possibly in connection with 
job specifications for the persons concerned 
- it will normally be appropriate to provide 
documentation of  the organisation of  security 
work by means of  an organisational chart 
5. 3 Asset control 
- it has to be ensured that all important parts 
(assets) of  the systems are known, so that they 
can be protected in accordance with their 
importance 
- a r_egister of  relevant IT equipment should 
therefore be maintained on an ongoing basis 
- in addition, updated network and systems 
documentation, showing for instance the 
connection and functionality of  the specific 
system elements, ought to be available 
5. 4 Personnel security 
- only persons with specific authorisation may  - screening of  personnel as part of  the 
have access to SIS data and to equipment used  recruitment procedure and repeated every 5 
to process SIS data  years 
- SIS may only be accessed when this is 
required to carry out the tasks for which the 
user is responsible 
,___---------------·--·-·------·------>---·-·-···  -···---------- -·-··--
28 -job descriptions for personnel with access to 
SIS data and to equipment used to process SIS 
data should include information on security 
responsibilities 
- staff recruitment practices should attach 
importance to knowledge of  data security 
- this personnel have to take the necessary user-
training programme, which has to include all 
current rules on data security 
- confidentiality and secrecy agreements have to 
be made with all persons who do not belong to 
any national authority 
- these persons must have the necessary 
clearance or certification 
- they should only get access to SIS data where 
this is required for the execution of  their tasks 
- chains of  command and procedures have to be 
defined, ensuring that security incidents or 
suspected security incidents are reported as 
quickly as possible 
- the procedure must be known by all internal 
personnel and external contractors 
- feedback processes have to be implemented to 
ensure that information about the results is 
communicated, once the incident has been 
dealt with and terminated 
- any contravention of  security rules has to be 
disciplined to the extent necessary, in 
conformity with national legislation 
29 5.5 Physical security 
- SIS data processing facilities (N.SIS, C. SIS  - a class 2 security area as defined by the 
and SIRENE) and other critical or sensitive  Council Decision of 19 March 2001
1 is 
resources, such as media storage areas, must  desirable in relation to the handling of  all SIS 
be housed in secure areas, each one protected  data (to the extent that SIS data processing 
by a defined security perimeter with  facilities handle EU confidential information, 
appropriate physical barriers and entry controls  at least a class 2 security area is necessary 
anyway) 
- computers located underground 
- different security zones 
- access cards 
-guards 
- monitoring by CCTV 
- the area has to be appropriately protected 
against any form of  intrusion 
- the external walls must be of  solid construction 
and the access doors must be suitably 
protected against unauthorised access, e.g. by 
control mechanisms, bars, alarms and locks 
- a building or site containing SIS data 
processing facilities must have an attended 
reception area or other means to control 
physical access 
- access to the secure areas containing the SIS  - monitoring of  entries and exits 
data processing and media storage facilities 
must be controlled and restricted to authorised 
persons 
1  Council Decision 2001/264/EC adopting the Council's security regulations, published in OJ 
L 101, p.  1 of 11.4.2001. 
30 - visitors to secure areas should be supervised or 
cleared 
- visitors should only be granted access for 
specific, authorised purposes 
- third party support services personnel should 
be granted restricted access to secure areas 
only when required 
- this access must be authorised and monitored 
5. 6 Equipment security 
- all equipment used to process or store SIS data 
must be protected against accidental damage 
or loss and unauthorised access 
5. 6.1 SIS data processing equipment 
- SIS data processing equipment must be located 
in an area to which access is minimised 
- continuous monitoring must be carried out to 
minimise the risk of  potential threats, 
including criminal or terrorist assaults, fire, 
overheating due to climate control failure, 
structural collapse after explosion, and 
penetration of  water 
- in order to achieve continuity of  power 
supplies, the following equipment must be 
ready and regularly checked and tested: 
•  an uninterruptable power supply (UPS), 
that keeps the essential functions running 
•  a backup generator for continued 
processing in case of  a prolonged  power 
failure 
- telecommunications cables must be protected 
to the necessary extent 
- fire, heat and smoke detection systems 
- automatic fire extinguishing system 
- sufficient air-conditioning 
31 - electronic network equipment must be 
installed in locked rooms or locked cabinets 
- only authorised maintenance personnel may 
carry out repairs and equipment maintenance 
- separate back-up system, regular check of  the 
switch between the back  -up and operational 
system 
5.6.2 Terminals and PC workstations 
- terminals, PC workstations and printers must 
be placed so as to ensure that unauthorised 
persons cannot read data thereon 
- procedures should be established to monitor 
printing from screen and SIS data listing 
- PC and terminal sessions must be 
automatically terminated after a period of  no 
activity and they must be protected by locking 
devices, passwords or other control measures 
whenever they are out of  use 
- terminals, PC workstations and printers that 
are installed in rooms to which there is access 
for the general public must be monitored 
constantly 
5. 7 Communications and operating management 
5. 7.1 Operating procedures and responsibility 
- the operating procedures established by the 
individual Schengen States must be 
documented and continuously updated 
- they must as a minimum, comprise the 
following: 
•  procedures for day-to-day operating 
measures such as back-up, anti-virus 
updating, network monitoring, etc. 
32 
- cold/hot standby or mirrored sites 
- in remote location so that a disaster affecting 
one site does not affect the other •  procedures for handling data media and 
other assets 
•  procedures concerned with access 
restrictions 
•  instructions on how to handle errors or 
other exceptional conditions 
•  support contacts in case unexpected 
operating or technical difficulties arise 
•  procedures for restarting and restoring the 
system after any system failure 
- satisfactory control of  all modifications of  SIS 
data processing facilities and systems should 
be ensured, including hardware, software or 
procedures 
- there need to be clear responsibility 
instructions and procedures for handling them 
5. 7. 2 Procedures for incident management 
- there must be emergency plans and escalation 
procedures to be used to remedy incidents that 
may potentially interrupt the operation of  the 
system and make the Schengen IT systems 
fully or partly inaccessible 
- if  an incident occurs which will not render the 
entire system inaccessible but will compromise 
data security, procedures must have been 
defined for detecting and handling such 
incidents 
33 5. 7. 3 Protection against malicious software 
- to protect the integrity of  software and data, a 
range of  security measures should be taken to 
prevent and detect the intrusion of  malicious 
software and contribute to restoring systems 
afterwards 
- these should include control measures for 
protection against viruses, worms, Trojan 
horses and other malicious software 
- as a minimum the following elements should 
be included: 
•  a formal policy requiring compliance with 
software licenses and prohibiting the use of 
unauthorised software 
•  anti-virus detection and repair software is to 
be deployed across all PC's with regular 
virus definition updates and scanning across 
servers, PC's and laptop computers; 
exceptions, if  any, should be documented 
•  any electronic mail attachments and  - forbid attachments which are exe.files, 
downloads will be checked for malicious  encrypted, contain macros or passwords, ... 
software before use; it should be stated 
where this check will be carried out: e.g. at 
electronic mail servers or when entering the 
network 
•  formal procedures for reacting against 
virus-related incidents have to be available 
5. 7. 4 Backup 
- backup copies of SIS data, configuration files  - make daily copies 
and applications must be taken regularly 
34 - all backup systems must be tested regularly to 
ensure that they conform to the requirements 
of  the operating plans 
- backup data must be subject to the physical  - keep copies in at least two different locations 
protection required and placed in different 
geographical locations 
- restoring procedures must be checked and  - twice a year 
tested regularly 
5. 7. 5 Network management 
- national transmission of  SIS data may only use  - encrypted network I radio I fax 
networks which are protected against 
unauthorised access 
- networks must be constantly monitored 
- measures have to be taken to protect the  - secure communications between the SIRENE 
confidentiality of  SIS data during transmission  and field offices I operational officers for the 
via communications networks  exchange of  personal data 
- access to SIS data from public networks such  - avoid that access to the Internet is possible 
as the Internet must not be possible  through the police network 
- transmission of  passwords and other security 
elements must be protected by encryption 
methods 
5. 7. 6 Handling of  data media 
- the number of  technical copies of  SIS data 
must be restricted to the minimum necessary 
(see Article 1  02(2)) 
- procedures must be established for handling 
and storing SIS data in order to protect such 
data against unauthorised retransmission or 
miSUSe 
- such procedures should comprise 
35 •  only authorised personnel should have 
access to computer-based storage media 
containing SIS data 
•  all media containing SIS data must be  - updates of  the SIS database that are sent to 
marked appropriately and adequately  consular posts should be sent on encrypted 
protected during their transportation  media and through diplomatic carrier 
•  media that are obsolete or no longer  - prevent the erroneous distribution of  data by 
required must be rendered unusable, or  inappropriately recycling material, including 
when they are reused, be treated in such a  paper 
way as to eliminate all SIS data  - replacement of  media by competent authorities 
or agreed/screened company 
- procedures for storing and destroying material/ 
clean desk policy 
- archives should be secure  - electronic archives provide the best security 
- access to archives should be controlled and  guarantees including logging of  access to and 
restricted to designated staff  use of  the files and audit facilities 
- such access should be monitored and  - electronic archives can include automatic 
registered  weeding and deletion functions 
- archives should be managed to ensure that  - in the case of  physical archives, a combination 
deletion policies are followed  of  a magnetic card and a personal code to 
access the archives was thought to be the best 
solution 
- print-outs in respect of  electronic archives 
should be avoided and in any case destroyed 
after use 
5. 8 User access control 
- there must be a user registration and de- - validation of  queries on sample basis 
registration procedure of  users for granting 
access to the different systems and services 
- this procedure must include: 
36 •  using unique user IDs, so that actions of 
individual users can be accounted for and 
users can be made responsible for their 
actions; therefore, the use of  group IDs 
must not be allowed 
•  each user must only have the minimum set 
of  access rights needed for the normal 
execution of  their jobs 
•  immediately removing access rights to SIS 
data whenever the respective users cease to 
exercise functions that imply the necessity 
to have such an access 
•  periodically checking that the level of 
access granted is according to the user 
profile 
•  periodically checking for, and removing, 
redundant user IDs and accounts 
- the allocation and administration of  passwords 
must be controlled by a formal procedure 
ensuring that: 
•  users are informed and aware of  their 
obligations in respect of  their passwords 
•  passwords are communicated to users in a 
safe way 
•  users are required to regularly change their 
passwords and reuse of  passwords is 
rejected, 
•  passwords are never stored in the computer 
system without any protection 
- a procedure has to be established to ensure 
regular revision of  all user access rights 
- the application may include a technical 
function to automatically close a user account 
when it has not been used for e.g. two weeks 
- the user ID and account can be automatically 
linked to the personnel status 
- a password should be changed every 60 to 90 
days 
37 5. 9 Monitoring system access and use 
- the national use of  the Schengen IT systems  - logs and audit trails in respect of  SIRENE files 
must be monitored in order to ensure detection  should be pro-actively monitored and retained 
of  unauthorised activities  for a sufficiently long period in accordance 
with domestic law 
- electronic workflow/case management systems 
provide the best means of  securing that every 
action taken on a SIRENE file is logged and 
audited 
- the transmission of  personal data shall be 
recorded in accordance with Article 103 of  the 
Schengen Convention 
- a log of  the user's log-on, and, as far as 
possible, log-off; attempts to connect or failed 
connections and attempts of  unauthorised use 
of  data should be kept for the period as set out 
in Article 103 
- the data recorded should include user ID, date 
and hour of  the incident and, if  possible, the 
identity and location of  the terminal 
5.10 Development and maintenance 
- to minimise the risk of  damage to operational 
systems, security control measures have to be 
established for data and programs 
- it should be ensured, for example, that the 
updating of  operational systems, including 
program libraries, is only executed subject to 
prior approval 
- before approval is granted, it has to be ensured 
that the updating has been tested and 
documented satisfactorily 
--
38 - a test system must be available separately from 
the production environment, so that changes 
can be tested before they are made operational 
and no test data are introduced in the 
operational system 
- any use of  real SIS data for testing purposes 
should be avoided unless they have been 
anonymised 
5.11 Emergency planning 
- each Schengen State must establish and 
implement suitable emergency planning 
measures, taking account for example of  the 
following situations: 
•  a N. SIS or network inaccessibility is noted 
•  some or all users are unable to search SIS 
data due to problems in the national IT 
infrastructure 
- the emergency plans have to be based on a risk 
assessment of  the threats that may lead to 
inaccessibility of  the system and the impact of 
the threats on the other Schengen States 
- emergency plans must, at a minimum, include 
the following: 
•  criteria for implementing the plans and 
measures to be taken immediately to assess 
the situation 
•  escalation procedures, in accordance with 
the procedures agreed upon for the 
Schengen States, with a view to informing 
the national management authorities, C. SIS 
and other Schengen States 
39 •  emergency procedures describing the 
measures to be taken after an incident that 
interferes with the accessibility of  the 
system 
•  fallback procedures describing the measures 
to be taken to shift essential N.SIS 
operations to alternative temporary servers 
•  restoring procedures describing measures to 
be taken to restore normal operation 
- emergency plans must be updated and staff 
routines tested regularly 
5.12 Control 
- procedures have to be established which  - regular security audits done by persons 
ensure ongoing control of  the compliance with  external to the IT  -department 
all applicable EU and national rules and 
regulations 
40 The purpose of the Catalogue is to clarify and detail 
the Schengen acquis, to provide an example for 
those States acceding to Schengen and to those 
already fully applying the Schengen acquis. 
The first volume of the Catalogue was published in February 
2002. It dealt with External borders control as well as with 
Removal and readmission. 
This second volume of the Catalogue addresses 
specifically the Schengen Information System and SIRENE. It 
gives a good indication to candidate 
countries for accession to the European Union as  to what is 
expected of them, particularly in practical terms, 
regarding Schengen. 